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Abstract—Software systems are increasingly open, handle large
amounts of personal or other sensitive data and are intricately
linked with the daily lives of individuals and communities.
This poses a range of privacy requirements. Such privacy
requirements are typically treated as instances of requirements
pertaining to compliance, traceability, access control, verification
or usability. Though important, such approaches assume that
the scope for the privacy requirements can be established
a priori and that such scope does not vary drastically once
the system is deployed. User data and information, however,
exists in an open, hyper-connected and potentially “unbounded”
environment. Furthermore, “privacy requirements - present” and
“privacy requirements - future” may differ significantly as the
privacy implications are often emergent a posteriori. Effective
treatment of privacy requirements, therefore, requires techniques
and approaches that fit with the inherent openness and fluidity of
the environment through which user data and information flows.
This paper surveys state of the art and presents some potential
directions in the way privacy requirements should be treated.
We reflect on the limitations of existing approaches with regards
to unbounded privacy requirements and highlight a set of key
challenges for requirements engineering research with regards to
managing privacy in such unbounded settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary software systems and services exist in a
hyper-connected setting and regularly collect, process or dis-
seminate massive amounts of data. Ensuring user privacy in
such settings is non-trivial. This, in turn, has led to privacy
concerns regarding potential individual and societal harms.
The problem is, however, compounded by the fact that both the
scale of this hyper-connected environment and the information
flowing through it is constantly growing. Facebook alone
has over 1 billion users and the volume of digital records
worldwide by the year 2020 will be measured in zettabytes
(1021) [1]. The number of connected devices is also expected to
grow to 50 billion by the year 2020 [2] driven by innovations
in smart cities, IoT, body-area networks, smart grids and wear-
able sensors. With digital technologies becoming embedded in
everyday objects and infrastructures, this effectively amounts
to privacy management on an ultra-large-scale.
Requirements engineering and the wider privacy research
have responded to these challenges. A number of approaches,
1Work was done while at Security Lancaster, currently working at Google.
tools and techniques have been developed for managing pri-
vacy requirements. Such approaches address privacy require-
ments from a particular perspective abstracted from the real-
world, e.g., compliance with privacy policies and regulatory
codes, traceability of privacy requirements through design and
implementation, access control models to limit visibility of
information to particular actors, and verifying the correctness
and usability of privacy controls operationalising the privacy
requirements. Though important such approaches are driven
by the notion of a bounded system – whereby the scope
of the privacy requirements is limited to the system under
consideration be it a social networking platform, a wireless
sensor network, a wearable device and so on.
Of course, best practice dictates that the interactions of
such a system with other systems and services are taken
into consideration during requirements engineering. This is
nevertheless based on the assumption that the interactions and
their scope can be established a priori and would not change
drastically over the lifetime of the system. This, certainly,
has been true in the past for traditional and relatively closed
and static systems, like health-care, student records, or stock
maintenance, where the privacy protection of the users was
wholly the responsibility of such systems and their hosting
organisations. Yet, the rise of the participatory data economy
and new technologies has dramatically changed this landscape.
There are hardly any “traditional” (or closed) systems left,
even health-care systems are embedding third-party web-
services into their daily work processes, e.g., monitoring and
controlling outpatient health state via mobile applications.
Moreover, now users – and not only organisations – actively
exchange data with their environment. Thus, user data and
information handled by such systems now exist in a potentially
unbounded setting – in which the information is not restricted
to any single domain, application, organisational, geographi-
cal, or contextual boundary – although technical mechanisms
are usually in place so that they cannot be easily subverted.
While some privacy requirements can, of course, be estab-
lished a priori, a range of unanticipated privacy requirements
only emerge a posteriori when the system comes into contact
with the hyper-connected setting. A recent example of this
is that of the “eavesdropping television sets” where voice
control features listen to all possible conversations to detect
commands. Even if we could anticipate all potential privacy
requirements a priori, “privacy requirements - present” and
“privacy requirements - future” may differ considerably and
are often determined by factors lying beyond the bound-
ary and interactions anticipated during system development.
For instance, privacy perspectives and concerns have shifted
substantially in the post-Snowden landscape. Similarly, at its
conception, WhatsApp guaranteed that user data would not be
shared with third-parties, a guarantee that was recently relaxed
following its takeover by Facebook1.
This survey highlights that effective treatment of privacy
requirements in such potentially unbounded settings requires
techniques and approaches that fit with the inherent openness
and fluidity of the environment through which user data and
information flows. This, in turn, requires a fundamental shift
in the way privacy requirements are treated. We categorise
existing approaches to fulfilling privacy requirements into four
broad classes, based on their treatment of privacy require-
ments, as instances of requirements pertaining to: Compliance,
Access Control, Verification and Usability. We critically reflect
on the strengths and limitations of approaches in each category
with regards to managing privacy in an unbounded setting.
Our analysis highlights that existing approaches are system-
centric and largely address shallow privacy requirements, i.e.,
those pertaining to basic data attributes at the point of sharing.
We highlight that effective treatment of privacy requirements
demands several fundamental shifts: from a system-centric to
cross-domain view of privacy; from privacy management to
user empowerment; and from shallow attribute-driven privacy
requirements to deep privacy that considers derived attributes
and synthetic data. Section II, next, provides a survey of the
state-of-the-art in privacy research and presents the strengths
and limitations of the approaches. Section III discusses the
key themes emerging from the survey and outlines a research
agenda. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART: PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
ENGINEERING
In the following, we present a classification of existing
approaches to handling privacy requirements, namely: Com-
pliance, Access Control, Verification and Usability. These
four classes have been derived by analysing existing state-
of-the-art in requirements engineering and the wider privacy
literature. The analysis of the state-of-the-art is by no means
exhaustive yet it provides a rich view of the four classes. By
classifying the approaches into these perspectives, an agreed
understanding about the nature and scope of the particular
perspective can be better elicited [3].
A. Privacy from the Perspective of Compliance
Approaches in this perspective operate on the basis of
deriving privacy requirements from data protection legislation.
The focus of these approaches is on eliciting and analysing
1https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/technology/relaxing-privacy-vow-
whatsapp-to-share-some-data-with-facebook.html? r=0
requirements that are necessary to make systems, such as
health-care, hotel management, etc., data protection legislation
compliant [4], [5], [6]. These methods make use of the
theoretical frameworks provided by legal scholars [7], [8] and
security/privacy standards frameworks [9] to elicit the privacy
requirements [5], [10] and model privacy expectations and
practices [11]. Other approaches have focused on expressing
traceability relationships between various software entities
such as legal documents, requirements and, source code [12],
[13], [14] and identifying inconsistencies in natural language
software requirements for a successful software system devel-
opment [15], [16].
1) Policies and Requirements: Anto´n et al. [17] present
a technique for aligning security and privacy policies with
system requirements of e-commerce websites via inspections.
The inspections were conducted using heuristics to compare
requirements, privacy and security policies to identify and re-
solve conflicts and inconsistencies across the documents early
in the software development process. The heuristics for the
comparisons were inherited from the Evolutionary Prototyping
with Risk Analysis and Mitigation Model (EPRAM) [18]
which includes risk and compliance assessment activities to
verify proposed requirements for compliance with security
and privacy policies. The approach uses goal models to
express requirements and policies. These models are then
cross-examined with each other to first identify what they call
‘critical conflicts’ (e.g., a policy exists but the corresponding
requirement is missing) and then re-examined for terminol-
ogy conflicts. Relationship indicators are defined to assess
the degree of compliance between requirements and policy
statements. Anto´n et al.’s work is among the first literature
on assessing compliance between requirements and policy
documents. However, the approach is highly manual. Although
the goal extraction activity is automated, significant effort is
required from analysts.
There has been a significant amount of work to ensure that
software requirements comply with governing legal texts and
privacy policies [6], [19]. Initial efforts in this area involved
extracting requirements from privacy policies. Young et al.
in [6], [19] introduced a systematic method - Commitment
Analysis - for obtaining requirements from privacy policies
of health-care organisations by extracting commitments, priv-
ileges, and rights. A commitment reflects an actor’s pledge; a
privilege reflects an action that an actor is entitled to perform;
and, a right reflects an action that an actor is entitled to per-
form while imposing an action on another party. The method
is composed of three steps: (1) the policy document is parsed
into individual statements; (2) policy statements are classified
based on a set of classifications; (3) classified statements
are operationalised into requirements using templates. In Step
2, the statements are classified based on scope, actors, and
concepts (commitments, privileges, and rights). This method
was aimed at aiding requirement engineers to analyse the
natural language text in privacy policies rather than using
an intermediate representation i.e. goals [17]. The method
focuses on the initial derivation of privacy requirements that
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are compliant with policies. This is a severe limitation as
policies and requirements tend to evolve independently and
this means a completely new set of requirements will have to
be produced every time there is a change (even a minor one).
Additionally, tracking policies and maintaining compliance
comes at a cost when commitments need to change, and in turn
software system requiring subsequent (manual) re-evaluation
against those evolving requirements. The cumulative cost of
minor changes rippling through can become unmanageable.
Breaux et al. [4] developed a method using Semantic
Parametrisation to extract rights and obligations from legal
documents, for example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule. The method
uses Goal-Based Requirements Analysis Method (GBRAM)
and Semantic Parametrisation (a process in which domain
descriptions are represented in first-order predicate logic) to
construct formal models from natural language texts. The
method is composed of two parts: (1) policy goal mining, in
which policy documents are translated into goal models; (2)
semantic parametrisation, in which the generated goal models
are transformed into restricted natural language statements
(RNLS) and then parametrised to achieve semantic models.
The semantic models can be leveraged to identify missing
information or clarify ambiguities and aid in conflict analysis.
Similar to the approaches described above, this work also pri-
marily focuses on deriving requirements from privacy policies
and legal documents (of health-care domains).
Hassan and Logrippo [20] present an approach to validate
compliance and consistency between legal and organisational
policies (or requirements). Requirements are extracted from
plain legal texts using a Unified Modeling Language (UML)
class model called Governance Extraction Model (GEM). The
authors classify legal statements into three types, namely
procedural, declarative and ontology. A procedural statement
takes the form if–then, while declarative statements reveal
system properties that can be translated into procedural state-
ments. Ontology statements can be either organisational struc-
ture statements or process ontology statements. Compliance
checking is then performed by translating the requirements
into a formal language – based on first-order logic – called
Governance Analyst Language (GAL). Finally, an implemen-
tation and validation checking is proposed to ensure that
the software meets organisational requirements. Although, the
authors propose this final validation step, details on how this
might be achieved are not discussed.
Robinson developed a framework, REQMON, to monitor
software requirements at runtime [21]. The framework is
composed of (1) a language for requirements and monitor
definitions; and, (2) a method for defining requirements, iden-
tifying obstacles and analysing monitor feedback. REQMON
uses the KAOS language, patterns and methodology for its
requirements and monitor definitions. REQMON automati-
cally links raw event data on system usage to measurements
on specified requirements. Monitoring determines if specified
properties, which ‘ought’ to occur, do in fact occur as desired;
it determines requirements satisfaction from the observed
behaviour. This approach focuses on runtime compliance with
system requirements but lacks in handling requirements that
may emerge a posteriori, that is, when the system comes into
contact other systems in a hyper-connected setting.
Gervasi et al. [15] propose an approach to automatically
discover inconsistencies in the requirements from multiple
stakeholders, using both theorem proving and model-checking
techniques. Inconsistency occurs when a specification con-
tains conflicting, contradictory descriptions of the expected
behaviour of the system to be built or of its domain [16].
The method presents (1) a formal framework for identifying,
analysing, and managing inconsistency in requirements spec-
ifications; (2) a parsing technique and a translation schema
that allow requirements expressed as simple (controlled) nat-
ural language sentences to be automatically transformed into
propositional logic formulae and the reverse i.e., propositional
logic to natural language sentences. Such a formalisation can
be leveraged to partially validate natural language require-
ments and/or policy documents.
The alignments of policy with commitments and regulations
to software requirements is definitely necessary to support
accountability as these techniques make auditing explicit and
possible. Nevertheless, the above approaches emphasise an
organisational viewpoint specifically for single systems (in a
domain with limited volatility e.g., health-care). In contrast,
modern software systems are required to exist in a more open
and volatile environment, often underpinned and driven by
the participatory data economy. As much as these formal and
practical approaches are considered state of the art, they may
not be adequate to adapt to the changing nature of software
systems that are more open, and where information flows from
one data controller to another in various contexts.
2) Traceability: Traditionally, traceability is achieved
through a matrix [22] which correlates any two baseline
artefacts e.g., requirements and architectural models, that may
have one-to-many or many-to-many relationships between
them. However, constructing and maintaining such matrices
are deemed complex and laborious tasks, especially since
software artefacts evolve over time, the traces tend to erode
into an inaccurate state. Newer traceability mechanisms have
been proposed over the last decade [23], [13] which in-
clude automated trace retrievals through machine learning
techniques [12] and mapping of requirements to legal docu-
ments [5]. These techniques have contributed and greatly eased
program comprehension and software reuse.
Massey et al. [5] evaluated the security and privacy require-
ments of an existing software system – iTrust, an open source
electronic health record system – for regulatory compliance
(HIPAA). The evaluation method comprises of four key ac-
tivities: (1) terminology mapping, in which the terms used
in the software requirements and legal text (with which the
corresponding requirements must comply) are mapped based
on actors, data objects and actions primitives; (2) requirements
identification and disambiguation, in which, each requirement
(from the previous step) is annotated with answers to a set
of questions (Inquiry Cycle model) and then disambiguated;
(3) requirements elaboration, in which disambiguated require-
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ments are documented for priority and origin (provenance);
(4) tracing requirements to legal texts, in which traceability
links are established for each requirement from the set of
requirements produced by step (3) and (4) to the relevant
statements in the legal text with which each requirement must
comply. This work mainly focuses on establishing trace links
between software requirements and legal texts which is an
important initial step in legal compliance and establishing
accountability. However, the approach is proposed for bounded
systems, in this case health-care systems. Here an important
question to consider is, what if the system becomes more
open, for instance, integration with a monitoring device that
sends back patient data? Such devices cause a range of privacy
requirements to emerge a posteriori when they intersect with
extant health-care systems and user behaviours.
Cleland-Huang et al. [12] proposed two machine learning
(ML) methods to automatically generate traceability links
between regulatory codes – a subset of HIPAA – and product
level requirements. The first ML approach uses a manually cre-
ated traceability matrix to train a classifier to trace regulatory
codes. The training set includes regulatory codes, requirements
and their associated traces. Requirements are classified based
on a score that reflects the degree to which a term (in the
requirement) represents a specific regulatory code. To evaluate
the effectiveness of the regulatory classifier, the authors used a
leave-one-out cross validation experimental design for tracing
the HIPAA rules against the patient health-care systems. In the
second ML approach, a novel information retrieval method
to mine terms and phrases from domain specific documents
is proposed. This approach is based on the idea that when
a training set is not available, a relevant set of indicator
terms can be learned from domain specific documents from
the Internet in order to replace or augment original trace
queries. The steps involved in this approach include: (a)
identify domain specific documents; (b) analyse identified
documents to extract domain specific terms; (c) compose the
terms into a new query which is used to execute the trace.
Both methods were evaluated by tracing security regulations
in the HIPAA document against the requirements of ten health-
care systems. A similar method with a different emphasis is
presented by Antoniol et al. [14], [13] in which traceability
links are established and maintained between source code and
text documents such as requirements, design documents and
user manuals. The approach was evaluated by tracing the
Java classes of Albergate (a hotel management system) to
its functional requirements. Once again these approaches are
developed based on and for bounded systems, namely health-
care and hotel management. The strength and weaknesses of
the work related to compliance are summarised in Table I.
B. Privacy from the Perspective of Access Control
Access control management is known to be a difficult
problem for end-users in diverse areas such as authentication,
authorisation, etc. [24]. The approaches presented in this
section focus on the realisation of access control mechanisms
with respect to disclosed user information.
TABLE I
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS.
Strengths
1) Consideration of security and privacy requirements at the early stages
of software development and not as an afterthought.
2) Development of formal languages for specifying policies and regula-
tory texts.
3) Implementation of traceability during software development life-cycle
allows engineers to navigate between and browse different software
artefacts.
4) The alignments of policy with commitments and regulations to soft-
ware requirements supports accountability as these techniques make
auditing explicit and possible.
Weaknesses
1) Methods for demonstrating traceability relationships primarily focus
on terms of compliance with governing legal documents – a posteriori
system implementation.
2) Inadequate for data intensive applications and hyper-connected sys-
tems like social networks, smart grids, etc. – most solutions are based
on less volatile and single domain systems such as health-care.
3) No support for the integration of privacy constraints that emerge a
posteriori and from external entities like third-party organisations.
4) Lack in providing continuous conformance to changing privacy re-
quirements and functionalities (implementation) – limited evolution
support.
1) Policy Languages: The goal of policy language research
is to develop platform independent technical privacy policy
languages that allow users and organisations to express the
privacy controls that they desire. In this case policies are
treated as a set of requirements that are operationalised as
controls. Using such policy languages service providers can
encode their data collection and usage practices in a machine-
readable format.
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [25] was the pio-
neering work in the policy languages domain. P3P documents
are based on an XML schema that allow service providers
to publish their privacy policies in a machine-readable format.
P3P-enabled browsers can read policies published in this XML
format and compare them with user specified privacy settings.
Users are able to rely on these browsers to read and evaluate
privacy policies on their behalf avoiding the overhead of
having to read through the natural language privacy policies’
legal jargon. A P3P statement comprises of: purpose – how
collected data is used and whether individuals can opt-in or
out of any of these uses; data – the types of data; recipients
– whether and under what conditions data can be shared
and whether there is an opt-in or out; and, consequence –
human readable explanation of a site’s data practices. Although
significant effort was invested in the development of P3P, it
was not widely implemented 2 and ceased operation in part
due to businesses not wanting to allow users to negotiate their
policies on an individual basis.
In contrast to P3P which is a web privacy policy
language, the Enterprise Privacy Authorisation Language
(EPAL) [26] and eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
2https://www.epic.org/reports/prettypoorprivacy.html
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(XACML) [27] are enterprise policy languages. Both EPAL
and XACML are XML based languages (as P3P) and primarily
used to represent the internal policies of an enterprise which
would help organisations to perform the actions as stated
in their privacy policies. While the two are very similar in
structure and concept, the differences between the languages
are significant, and greatly affect their usability and their
ability to meet the requirements of an enterprise privacy policy
language [28]. One notable difference between the two is that
EPAL is mainly targeted at privacy policies and not access
control policies in general.
Research in policy languages have considered extensively
users’ requirements for expressing privacy preference at the
time of design, and provided vocabularies to cover key aspects
including purposes, obligations, and data retentions. Although
this is a positive step in terms of increasing understandability
of privacy policies these languages ended up being too com-
plicated for users to comprehend and parse. Follow-up studies
like [29] have shown that it is impractical to expect extensive
inputs from users for setting up their preferences, creating an
avoidable barrier for adoption. Alternate proposals were made
by Sadeh et al. [30] to use “privacy personas” for representing
user privacy preferences wherein, clusters of people can be
identified based on the similarities in the type and amount of
information they chose to disclose about themselves. Never-
theless, an important drawback of the proposed solutions are
the fact that they focus on handling privacy issues relating to
the first hop of personal data flow from the user. This means
that they do not cover all the data processors who may end up
receiving users’ personal data especially in a hyper-connected
and potentially unbounded setting.
2) Browser–Based Privacy Solutions: Fredrikson and
Livshits [31] present an in-browser approach, RePriv, that
aims to perform personalisation while preserving user privacy.
RePriv achieves this goal by requiring explicit user consent
in any transfer of sensitive user information. The prototype
includes: (1) a mining algorithm that observes users’ browsing
behaviour and automatically updates a profile of user interests;
(2) a communication protocol on top of HTTP that allows web
sites to utilise the information maintained in the browser; (3)
an extension framework that allows third-party extensions to
mine and utilise the information maintained by RePriv, and
interact programatically with web sites. The authors also show
how, with the help of static software verification, third-party
code can be incorporated into the system, and given access
to sensitive user information, without sacrificing control and
user consent.
Guha et al. [32] propose a framework, Ibex, for author-
ing, analysing, and deploying secure browser extensions. The
framework provides an API that exposes core browser func-
tionality to extensions. These APIs are designed for the static
verification of extension security and therefore mediate access
to features that can be abused by malicious extensions. To
describe an extension’s privilege over browser resources, the
framework includes a policy language based on Datalog. The
policy language allows the specification of fine-grained au-
TABLE II
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF ACCESS CONTROL SOLUTIONS.
Strengths
1) Provide individuals with the ability to control the information they
reveal to others at a higher level of granularity.
2) Enhances economical gains of businesses, namely social networks
– enable them to carefully use data mining technologies to obtain
hidden information with out any potential intrusion to users’ privacy.
Weaknesses
1) Addresses the privacy management problem purely from an access
control perspective within a single stakeholder/entity (single-hop).
2) Correctness of access controls are mainly verified independently
of policies (which are presented to users) – privacy policies and
controls are treated as separate entities.
3) Browser-based solutions focus on simple mechanisms to check for
users’ privacy preferences, at the time of data disclosure.
thorisation and data flow policies on web content and browser
state which are accessible by extensions. The framework also
includes a policy visualisation tool that helps an administrator
to estimate an extension’s access rights on specific web pages,
formal semantics of policies in terms of a safety property on
the execution of extensions, and a verification method that
allows static verification of extensions for policy compliance.
This work highlights the strength of static checkers and how
it can be utilised in tracking information flow and extracting
code identifiers, e.g., function names and variables.
FaceCloak [33] which is implemented as a browser exten-
sion protects user privacy on social networks by shielding
one’s personal information from the social media site and
other users who does not have authorised access. Privacy
Bucket [34] measures the extent to which third-party trackers
can discover demographic information about its users. For ex-
ample, visiting online shopping sites like Monsoon to purchase
evening wear may suggest that the user is female within a
certain age group. The goal of Privacy Bucket is to provide
an overview of information that can be discovered about them
through their browsing habits.
The ease of deployment of browser-based solutions has led
to their rise as a privacy protection mechanism. However,
browser-based protections are merely discrete steps in the
absence of a comprehensive privacy solution. Similar to policy
languages these solutions address issues related to a single hop
of personal data flow from the user. Ultra-large-scale hyper-
connected settings bring a bigger challenge in terms of data
flow, i.e., multi-hop, and pose a wicked problem for privacy
requirements engineering. The strength and weaknesses of the
work related to access control are summarised in Table II.
C. Privacy from the Perspective of Verification
Approaches in this perspective focus on the verification and
correctness of software systems using formal methods [35],
[36], [37], [38]. They innovate by applying formal methods
for verification of security and privacy requirements which
enhances software reliability of systems that employ them.
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TABLE III
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF VERIFICATION SOLUTIONS.
Strengths
1) Fully automated technique for verifying behavioural properties of a
model of a system by exhaustively enumerating its states – that is
checking every possible execution of a system.
2) Have the ability to provide a counter-example, i.e., when a program
fails to satisfy a property, model checking always demonstrates an
execution of the system which renders the property violated.
Weaknesses
1) Not very scalable to very large hyper-connected systems unless the
model is very abstract – as the size of software increases, it becomes
very hard to build and test e.g., state explosion problem.
2) Traditional approaches to model checking have been to build a
model of the system and verify it; the actual implementation is
done after the model has been verified which contradicts current
web application development practices.
3) Deriving a model from the source code is a key problem especially
when the system is open and connected with other systems; wherein
a coarse abstraction may not be precise enough to prove the
property, and the analysis of a detailed abstraction time consuming.
Model checking is an automatic technique for verifying
finite state systems [35]. This technique for validation of
software has gained increasing appeal in systems that han-
dle sensitive data, mainly because it can perform exhaustive
checking. Fisler et al. [36] attempt a model-checking based
verification system, Margrave, for analysing role-based access
control policies. The verification system consumes a policy
(requirement), represented using XACML, and a property
and determines whether the policy satisfies this property.
The verifier translates the XACML policies into a form of
decision diagram i.e., multi-terminal binary decision diagrams
(MTBDD), to answer queries that verify a system property.
May et al. [37] present a framework that formalises regu-
latory rules, namely HIPAA, and exploits this formalisation
to automatically analyse the rules’ conformance in a health-
care system. Their formalisation is known as the ‘privacy
APIs’ – modelled using Promela, a C-like language – and
is an extension of the basic set of access control matrix
operations. The key advantage of this formalism is its ability
to preserve the subtleties of the law during modelling and
analysis of regulatory texts. The framework details a method
that translates natural language text to this formal language.
Upon translation, the rules are converted into a format suitable
for input to a standard model checker. Finally, the framework
also allows for policy evaluation.
Basin et al. [38] show how policies can be formalised
using metric first-order temporal logic (MFOTL) and be used
for monitoring system compliance to those policies. MFOTL
is an expressive first-order language with metric temporal
operators. The first-order fragment is used for formalising
relations on system data, while the metric temporal operator
is used to specify properties depending on the times i.e., past,
present, and future system events. The approach illustrates
the formalisation of a variety of security policies including
Chinese Wall, compliance and history-based access-control
policies, which are important for many enterprises and which
govern the access and the usage of sensitive data. Formalised
policies are then used to monitor and evaluate the conformance
of system behaviour to the policies.
Model checkers and model-based approaches are prominent
practices in software verification for compliance with security
and privacy requirements. Nevertheless, model-checking tools
are primarily applied on static software systems and not on
systems that inherently change, for instance, data intensive ap-
plications like online social networks. The profile information
that users provide to social networks, along with their social
graphs, interactions with internal and external applications,
and linkable actions outside the network open up such systems
and lead to privacy implications that are often emergent a
posteriori. The strength and weaknesses of the work related
to verification are summarised in Table III.
D. Privacy from the Perspective of Usability
Usability researchers focus on the evaluation and under-
standing of user behaviours, needs, and motivations through
observation techniques, and analysis of usability problems
of existing privacy solutions. This perspective covers a wide
spectrum which includes user studies on privacy percep-
tions [39], [40], [41], privacy breaches in social media [42],
and improvement of user awareness [43], [44], [45].
A pioneering study on Facebook users’ privacy settings
was conducted in 2006 by Acquisti et al. [45] during which
Facebook was still a social network for colleges and high
schools. This study measured the accuracy of users’ percep-
tions of their level of disclosure by questioning them on
the visibility of their profiles and comparing their answers
against the amount of data available to all members of the
users’ university network. The results indicated that 8% of
the users were sharing more than they expected and 11%
were sharing less than they expected, but overall most users,
70%, were fully aware of what they were sharing [45]. This
study was a follow-up from the author’s previous study [44]
that passively measured information disclosure on Facebook in
which the majority of users shared large amounts of personal
information, but only a minority of them chose to limit access
to their profile to just friends (0.06%).
Bonneau et al. [43] conducted a comprehensive study on
privacy of 45 online social networks (OSNs) using criteria
such as the diversity of data collected by the sites, the types
of privacy controls, promotional methods etc. Their study
included a general analysis of legal privacy policies in which
attributes like the accessibility of privacy policies, their length,
data claims and so on were examined. The authors then present
a privacy communication game model, in which they conclude
that OSNs may have evolved to communicate differently
to users with different levels of privacy concerns. Another
empirical evaluation shows that OSN privacy settings do not
match sharing intentions [41]. There is a mismatch between
OSN users’ beliefs and their information sharing practices.
Their results indicate that every participant (N=260) had at
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least one incorrect privacy setting. Krasnova et. al [46] held a
focus group with 210 university students about their concerns
on the use of Facebook. The most frequently reported theme
was concern over unwanted audiences such as supervisors,
subordinates and parents, viewing shared content. Participants
also reported concerns over the collection and use of their data
by the OSN provider and third-parties.
Gurses et al. [42] distinguish between four categories of
OSN-specific privacy breaches encompassing issues of inde-
terminate visibility of user profile information, separation of
identities and aggregation as well as misappropriation and
contested ownership of user data. Indeterminate visibility is the
problem of a user’s profile being visible to others without the
user’s explicit knowledge or approval; separation of identities
refers to the problem of a user’s internal and/or external
identity, which selectively reveal information, being exposed
through data aggregation; contested ownership describes the
problem of explicit and implicit definitions of data ownership
that lead to privacy breaches; and, misappropriation is the
problem when users’ OSN data is re-purposed for a different
context from its original collection purposes. These categories
are interdependent but highlight different aspects of privacy
breaches. Additionally, the work also presents privacy design
heuristics to overcome these breach categories.
Luders et al. [39] performed a user study on the experience
and attitudes of the general public, primarily Norwegian users,
with regard to personal and consumer protection in social
media. This survey showed that users’ knowledge on how
social media functions in regards to use, disclosure and transfer
of their personal data is largely inadequate. The authors
reported that users found the privacy controls to be difficult
to configure and comprehend. In contrast, Majeski et al. [40]
investigated users’ sharing intentions and actual privacy con-
trols in search of infringement. The study found that every one
of their participants (N=65) had at least one sharing violation
based on their stated sharing intentions. Both studies share a
similar motivation that despite continuous efforts from OSN
providers, users are still dissatisfied and concerned about the
consequences of sharing their personal data.
The lack of usability and the complexity of configuring
privacy controls have been identified as one of the main causes
for unintended data disclosure in OSNs by the approaches
above. However, usability and complexity are only part of
the problem. Unlike “traditional” systems i.e., health-care,
or student records, in which the responsibility of managing
one’s privacy is upheld by the concerned organisation, “newer”
systems, i.e., OSNs, require users to take an active role in
protecting their privacy online. Herein, there is a shift in
responsibility which demands for new privacy requirements
and software engineering models that handle both usability
and process of engineering privacy into these newer systems.
The strengths and weaknesses of the work related to usability
are summarised in Table IV.
TABLE IV
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF USABILITY SOLUTIONS.
Strengths
1) Presents to users the inherent problems they face in configuring
privacy controls.
2) Enable the development of tools that increases comprehension and
contributes to the minimisation of cognitive overhead for users.
Weaknesses
1) Targets only GUI complexities.
2) Lacks mechanisms and models that will allow the mapping
of privacy requirements, articulated in the social context (user-
perspective) of the system-to-be, to abstract properties, i.e., proper-
ties that are modelled and guaranteed by privacy solutions.
3) No support for traceability of privacy controls to policies displayed
on a website, which is critical to establish users’ trust.
III. RESEARCH AGENDA
Tables I-IV in Section II highlight the strengths and weak-
nesses of existing approaches to complying with privacy
requirements in each of the four categories. The limitations
of the work reviewed in the four above discussed categories
are summarised in Table V under three headings:
• The System-Centric heading refers to the issue that treatment
of privacy remains focused around one (possibly distributed)
system and does not effectively tackle the complexity of
understanding, analysing, managing and operationalising
privacy requirements in highly open and interconnected set-
tings. As discussed before, existing work has not addressed
privacy issues arising from a system’s edges bleeding into
several others (e.g., with health data getting mixed up with
fitness applications and the integration of social networks
through social-plugin).
• The Syntactical heading refers to the problem of “first
hop” in personal data flow. Existing privacy solutions have
focused on issues relating to the first hop of the personal data
flow from the user, i.e., they focus on protecting privacy-
related information (such as birth date, search terms, and
relationship status) from being shared with the party with
whom the user is currently communicating. They do not
address protection and/or use of the once shared data across
subsequent communications or further sharing with third-
parties. Based on the reviewed perspectives only work on
usability has looked at post-first-hop issues, albeit from the
viewpoint of users’ perceptions.
• The Attribute-Driven heading refers to the fact that existing
approaches focus on protecting privacy by limiting the
disclosure of a subset of data attributes such as personally
identifiable information (PII) and not information that can
be inferred from other shared information.
Treating privacy as an unbounded concern is, extremely
challenging. However, significant advances can be made by
addressing the three fundamental limitations above and broad
privacy requirements that lie at the core of such unbounded
concern. We outline these broad requirements next, highlight
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TABLE V
LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING STATE-OF-THE-ART
System-Centric Syntactical Attribute-Driven
Compliance 3 3 3
Access-Control 3 3 3
Verification 3 3 3
Usability 3 3
current work that tackles aspects of these requirements and
identify open problems as a research agenda for requirements
engineering research and the wider software engineering and
privacy research communities. We note that these broad re-
quirements are not orthogonal.
A. System-Centric to Cross-Domain Privacy Requirements
As highlighted in Section II, current research typically takes
an organisation- or network-centric view of privacy. Similar to
policy enforcement in distributed system settings, this trans-
lates to either an obligation-driven or authorisation-driven [47]
approach. In the former case, actions are enforced in response
to particular events or stimuli within a system while, in the
latter, access control rules specify whether a particular subject
can legitimately access (or not) a particular object. Such
approaches assume that the system, whether distributed or
not, is within a single administrative control and even where
platform or geographical boundaries are crossed, this happens
within the control of a single organisation or a federated
identity management framework [48]. In contemporary hyper-
connected settings, data and information regularly crosses
a range of platform, administrative, organisational and even
geographical boundaries. This can be exemplified by a typical
scenario whereby an individual uses his/her own device (e.g.,
a mobile phone or a laptop), a third-party network (e.g., an
Internet cafe) and cloud services (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive)
to access, manage and utilise his/her personal data or infor-
mation. One may argue that such cross-domain settings can
be managed through service-level agreements (SLAs) between
various providers in the above scenario. However, violation of
such SLAs is often only detected post-hoc. Furthermore, in a
large set of scenarios, for instance, those involving untrusted or
partially-trusted third-party networks, specification, agreement
and enforcement of an SLA is impossible.
What is required is a shift in perspective – from that
of system-centric and data-origin-centric view of privacy to
understanding and addressing privacy requirements arising
from the cross-domain nature of contemporary settings. One
way of potentially achieving this is by instilling accountability
and transparency. Information accountability means the use
of information should be transparent so it is possible to
determine whether a particular use is appropriate under a
given set of rules and that the system enables individuals
and institutions to be held accountable for misuse [49]. Some
research work is already heading in this direction, for instance,
there is a body of work on audit-based solutions for data
access in healthcare systems [50], or suggesting means of
deterrence for information that requires more than traditional
access control enforcement [51], or others offering a posteriori
control for systems that require flexibility with accesses that
are unanticipated under special circumstances [52]. However,
there is a lack of such work in the context of hyper-connected
systems like social networks, where the end user is the major
active player, i.e. they have to actively manage their personal
data as their own data controller across domains, instead of
the system administrator.
Therefore, we call out to the research community to create
new or adapt existing privacy requirement models to facilitate
the notion of “accountability” and support the integration
of privacy requirements that may emerge a posteriori. Such
models will enable institutions and individuals to be called or
identified to account for data misuses.
B. Privacy Management to User Empowerment
In many ways the basic premise of “privacy management” is
flawed. In a potentially unbounded, cross-domain, information
flow such privacy management is quite impossible except
in the case of the most elementary privacy requirements.
This is reflected in the focus on the “first hop” and privacy
management at the point of sharing. Privacy, however, is
highly contextual. Privacy trade-offs can often be essential to
empower otherwise marginalised groups. For instance, [53]
highlights scenarios where location privacy must be dimin-
ished to enable victims of domestic violence to access digital
support services in physical locations away from their abuser.
What is required is a shift in perspective – from that
of privacy management to empowering users with regards
to their data and information, how it is utilised and how
privacy is preserved as it flows through a hyper-connected
environment. Some initial work in this direction has recently
emerged. For instance, Bilogrevic et al. use machine learn-
ing techniques to enable optimised information sharing on
user’s context and schedule availability through the SPISM
system [54]. Each sharing request is considered with respect
to 18 different features that help to align this request with the
user’s preferences and sharing history. If SPISM can then,
with high certainty, class a given request as acceptable or
not, it will resolve the request accordingly, otherwise it will
request an explicit decision from the user. While this approach
shows encouraging results (90% correct decisions as per user
feedback), it is not able to support more than 9 simultaneous
policies per user, and yet again, focuses on the first-hop of
data sharing only. Whereas in [55], Omoronyia et al. discuss
how privacy disclosure can be regulated through the so-called
privacy awareness requirements and demonstrate that such
requirements are useful for establishing trade-offs between
the need to disclose information (e.g., for social interaction,
such as sporting activities) and wish to minimise threats to
own privacy. Here both static attributes and inferred data and
behaviour are considered and data flow history is accounted
for in disclosure decision making. However, this work too
assumes “complete” knowledge of the participating actors,
context, and the privacy parameters. Yet, privacy must exist in
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the real world under incomplete knowledge, uncertainty, and
inevitable error recovery. A fundamental shift is also required
in participatory data economy models with regards to user
empowerment, as exemplified in [56], wherein a trade-off
framework incorporates a utility function of data sharing as the
benefit from interaction with other users and potential privacy
violations as the cost function which has to be balanced against
gains. Using these two functions, this work adapts the intended
sharing circle each time to maximise users’ overall utility.
Unfortunately, truly meaningful utility and cost functions are
not easy to construct.
Such a shift in perspective, therefore, requires approaches
in Section II to incorporate truly adaptive decision making
techniques (such as those facilitated via machine learning),
preserve history of the data exchange, and to review the
utility and cost of each data sharing transaction. The notion of
requirements@runtime [57] can potentially play an important
role in realising such requirements.
C. Shallow Privacy to Deep Privacy Requirements
As discussed previously, one of the key issues across the
various approaches examined in Section II is that they are
often focused on an attribute-driven view of privacy. This
is normally driven by regulatory requirements that call for
protection of personally identifiable information (PII). While
this is important, this nevertheless represents a shallow view
of privacy requirements in contemporary settings. Research
has already shown that “identifiable” information can be
inferred from data beyond PII [58], [59], [60] and that it
is possible to link seemingly disparate pieces of information
about individuals online [61].
What is required is a shift in perspective – from that of a
shallow view of privacy to a deeper view of privacy require-
ments that goes beyond basic attributes and considers derived
attributes and synthetic data within the scope of privacy re-
quirements. From a general software engineering perspective,
existing work on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) [62]
deals with measuring and protecting informational privacy
by eliminating or minimising personal data using privacy
preserving techniques like k-anonymity [63] and differential
privacy [64], [65]. The primary objective of these solutions
is to minimise identity leaks, promote transparency and to
provide controls over data post-collection. However, there is
limited research in this area from a requirements engineering
perspective. The most relevant work is by Gu¨rses et al. [66],
which proposes a privacy requirements ontology to provide
a set of concepts to reconcile the different privacy notions,
solutions (that are often abstracted away from a specific
context) and their interpretation in a given context by different
stakeholders (multilaterality) during requirements engineering.
The ontology extends the Zave and Jackson [67] model to bet-
ter integrate stakeholder preferences with web-based systems
and privacy. Although, this work is a step towards highlighting
the need for existing requirements engineering methods to
address a “deep” view of privacy, significant advances are
needed. This requires requirements engineering approaches
to, at least, start incorporating simple derived attributes, e.g.,
addressing issue of location privacy inferred based on known
average speed and a previously known location [54], or that of
probabilistically derived attributes through history of sharing
and interaction. Addressing such issues can act as a stepping
stone towards tackling the hard challenge of deep privacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a review of the current
privacy-related research, categorising it into coherent groups
and identifying the strengths and weaknesses of addressing
privacy issues from each of these perspectives. We have also
outlined three broad core requirements critical to developing
the research and practical capacity to address privacy require-
ments in potentially unbounded settings where:
• personal data no longer belongs to any single domain, appli-
cation, organisational, geographical, or contextual boundary;
• individual users (and not only organisations) are the poten-
tial managers, beneficiaries, and victims in terms of gains
and losses from their privacy disclosure and protection, and
• privacy protection depends not only on direct privacy at-
tributes, but also on the way that one’s shared data continues
to flow across the various boundaries, and unexpected pri-
vacy breaches can occur through aggregation and analysis
of seemingly unrelated, publicly available data.
We must observe that the environment where software and
related privacy concerns reside has already morphed into such
an unbounded setting. The privacy challenges stemming from
this unbounded nature of privacy have also already started to
materialise and will become more and more pressing. Yet,
the software engineering research in general and requirements
engineering in particular have not yet progressed sufficiently
in addressing these challenges. Requirements engineering re-
searchers can, and should, lead the way.
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